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Dagon	as	Queer	Assemblage:	
Effeminacy	and	Terror	in	Samson	
Agonistes	
	DREW	DANIEL		
 
 
Introduction: The Foul Yoke of Effeminacy 
 
hough it is now many years since the original controversy erupted with 
John Carey’s assertion in a review of Stanley Fish’s How Milton Works that 
“September 11 has changed Samson Agonistes,” the repercussions of this 
fractious public debate continue to inflect how the work is read at the present 
time.1 In the wake of this polarizing conflict, interpretation of the poem as a 
complex whole has been upstaged by an urgent pressure to critically avow or 
disavow Samson’s final action as either divinely inspired or pathological, with the 
tantalizingly over- determined massacre of the assembled Philistines in the temple 
of Dagon functioning for both sides as evidence for – or against – an authorial 
endorsement of the spectre of “terrorism” allegedly mobilized within Milton’s 
closet drama. What are we to make of the “rousing motions” that lie at the core 
of this poem’s central moment of decision? How might the possibilities of a 
“queer Milton” or, for that matter, a “queer Samson,” reorient this seemingly 
intractable crux? It is my gambit that a consideration of the constitutive links 
between effeminacy and terror – links I shall trace both across the Miltonic corpus 
and within its titular character – might allow us to rethink recent critical traffic 
between Samson Agonistes and the security state by exposing a queer logic of near-
resemblance through which Milton’s text both solicits and frustrates typological 
expectation.  
Samson Agonistes (1671) establishes a rhythmic emotional pattern in which 
hopeful visitors try to draw Samson out of his thing-like withdrawal, and are 
rewarded with either brutally reflexive rejection or violent threats. To (briefly) 
rehearse the dramatic sequence of events: His father Manoa proposes that a 
ransom be paid in order to liberate Samson from enslavement, tempting him with 
the possibility of a return home. His estranged wife Dalila seeks reconciliation, and 
tries to tempt him with the promise of “conjugal affection.” The brute Harapha 
tries to tempt Samson into single combat to determine the relative supremacy of 
the god of Israel against a pagan challenger. Finally, his captors try to tempt 
Samson to display his strength and submission for the Philistine elite. This dialogic 
sequence of temptations refused cumulatively builds an affective tension between 
violence and compliance that leads to the work’s notorious catastrophe. After a 
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mysterious transformation in which “I begin to feel / Some rousing motions in 
me which dispose / To something extraordinary my thoughts,” Samson permits 
himself to attend the enemy’s “holy day” (1381-83).2 His ironic performance of 
pseudo- submission culminates in an offstage act of horrific violence: Samson 
pulls down the pillars that support the theater-like structure in which the Philistine 
nobility are celebrating their triumph, in the process destroying the feast of Dagon 
and himself.  
If these potentially compromising temptations loosely parallel the series 
of temptations rejected by Christ in the poetic drama’s textual partner, Paradise 
Regained, the intended consequence of that typological pressure remains subject to 
a curiously restricted pair of options: typology or anti-typology, a binary that drives 
even Julia Lupton’s show-stopping critical formulation that “Milton’s Samson is 
finally not typological (a figure of Christ), or even typological in a terminally 
suspended way (“exil’d from light”), but anti-typological, arresting the recuperative 
moment of typology in the sheer violence of his act.”3 Faced with a choice between 
a Samson that resembles Christ and a Samson that deliberately fails to sustain such 
a resemblance, I want to risk a question that is deliberately impertinent to the 
prevailing debate: how might the queer textual experience of Samson’s effeminacy 
complicate the problem of typological resemblance itself? Going further, how 
might the pursuit of this question open out both the conjunctive disjunction of 
Milton studies with queer studies, and the sticky relevance of Samson Agonistes to 
the security state it supposedly prefigures?  
Samson’s stony, stoic refusals, and the upsurge of superhuman athleticism 
that overwhelms them, have together consolidated his identity as the definitive 
avatar of masculine fortitude, the idée reçu of the strong, silent type. Milton has 
other ideas. Far from impregnable and self-evident, in Samson Agonistes Samson’s 
manhood is marked first and foremost by a persistent anxiety about its capacity to 
betray itself and transform into a disastrously compromising effeminacy. Tracking 
this as a historical structure with critical effects upon the present, in this essay as 
a whole I shall move between “manhood” and “masculinity” as the gendered term 
against which Samson’s “effeminacy” shows up as its threatening structural 
inversion. For my purposes, “manhood” should be understood not only in relation 
to boundaries of gender but also to boundaries of ethos, polis and species; in early 
modernity, the opposite of manhood is not (only) “womanhood” or “femininity” 
but also in-civility, brutality, animality, in- humanity.4 The conceptual space of the 
“un-manly” thus constitutes a negative reserve in which class, ethnicity, species, 
and gender differences mutually figure each other, and reservoirs of meaning from 
any of these separate registers can flow into the space opened up within manhood 
by effeminacy.  
Anxiety about the inward contamination of male gender by effeminate 
possibility constitutes a thread of queer fear that runs throughout Milton’s poetry 
and his prose, taking different local forms each time, but sharing a family 
resemblance with its locus classicus, the angelic reproach in Paradise Lost directed 
at “Man’s effeminate slackness” (11.632). Samson’s self-hatred focuses its energy 
through an insistent proclamation of the “effeminacy” he supposedly 
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demonstrated in succumbing to Dalila's demands that he reveal the secret of his 
strength:  
At times when men seek most repose and rest,  
I yielded, and unlocked her all my heart, 
Who with a grain of manhood well resolved  
Might easily have shook off all her snares:  
But foul effeminacy held me yoked  
Her bond-slave. O indignity, O blot 
To honor and religion! Servile mind 
Rewarded well with servile punishment! (406-413)  
 
Samson’s scenario of “yielding” and “unlocking” in the night summons up the 
remorseful laments of despoiled maidens bewailing the loss of their virginity – but 
ironically what has been lost here (momentarily displaced? forever dissolved?) is 
not maidenhood, but “manhood.” The reference to other men as a class marks 
Samson as somehow cut off from homosocial solidarity, defenseless against his 
own servile gullibility. “Holding” him against his will, effeminacy is made here into 
an agent whose foul embrace cannot be withstood.5  
Here we must attend to a discrepancy in the signification of “effeminacy” 
itself within the period. The term could designate a male with “womanly” 
characteristics, its first meaning, but it could also signify a male with an inordinate 
weakness for women; as the OED notes in reference to usage in Caxton (1460) 
and Puttenham (1589), “the notion ‘self-indulgent, voluptuous’ seems sometimes 
to have received a special colouring from a pseudo-etymological rendering of the 
word as ‘devoted to women’. Unequivocal instances are rare.”6 If we keep this second 
definition in mind, then Samson’s self-accusation may simply be directed at his 
gullibility, and his indulgence of his wife. Certainly the Biblical source in the book 
of Judges sounds this note, with its joke-like repetition of Dalila’s demand for 
Samson’s secret eventually producing the desired revelation in a disastrous display 
of credulity. Secondarily speaking, “effeminate” could simply be a synonym for 
“uxorious.”  
Yet the capacity of the meaning of effeminacy in the period to slide 
between its two distinct definitions also usefully marks an ambient difference 
between early modern understandings of gender and normative (if equally 
debatable) “modern” schemas of sexual orientation. In our own cultural moment, 
in which we are subject to the reified sexological categories of heterosexuality and 
homosexuality and are schooled by popular psychology to probe for the occulted 
undersides of how those locations manifest themselves in everyday life, an 
“effeminate” male potentially falls under suspicion of so-called “latent” or 
unacknowledged homosexuality in a manner compatible with the first meaning 
but necessarily incongruous with the second. By contrast, for early modern 
subjects the polarities of “masculine” and “feminine” stand in a more volatile 
relationship as, on the one hand, social positions structured by rigid and divinely 
ordered prescriptions about rule and obedience, and, on the other, developmental 
outcomes placed by classical physiology into an entangling proximity.  
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Effeminacy’s second definition within early modernity draws its strength 
from a historically distinct morphological imaginary sourced, ultimately, in a 
classical inheritance. Samson’s sense of effeminacy as an invasion from within 
recalls John J. Winkler’s formulation of sex and gender in classical Mediterranean 
culture as one in which “‘woman is not only the opposite of man; she is also a 
potentially threatening ‘internal émigré’ of masculine identity.”7 Such a possibility 
might be said to constitute the bad dream of the so-called “One Sex model” so 
widespread within New Historicist readings of Galenic physiology in the wake of 
Thomas Laqueur’s seminal Making Sex. If women are only born women because 
of their stalled developmental progress within the womb en route to becoming 
men, might it not also be possible that “from within” a man might somehow lapse 
and slide backwards towards another gendered location? This is the inverse 
scenario to the hermaphroditic possibility that animates that touchstone of New 
Historicist thought on the swerves and curves of gender normativity, Steven 
Greenblatt’s “Fiction and Friction” in Shakespearean Negotiations, in which sufficient 
heat permits the extroversion of “Marie” le Marcis’s female genitals into their final, 
normative male form as the male genitals of Marin le Marcis.8 If the pseudo-revolt 
of transvestite theater described therein through Greenblatt’s reading of Viola 
occurred under the protective shade of a normative masculine superiority, then, 
framed against this New Historicist critical rubric, the effeminate male is the early 
modern gender system’s worst possible outcome. This is so not because he is a 
figure neither successfully masculine nor authentically feminine (granting that such 
secondary authenticity is in a peculiar sense impossible given the inherent 
insufficiency of the feminine position), but because, as a backslider, he is the only 
agent capable of betraying the forward course of masculine supremacy itself. 
Loitering with intent in a contaminating interstitial space between genders, the 
early modern effeminate man is a gender recusant.  
Acutely afraid of his own effeminacy but also eager to self-consciously 
punish himself for it, Samson seems at pains to accuse himself of specifically the 
second kind of effeminacy – but he risks protesting too much in the process, and 
his accounts of that condition slide uncomfortably “forwards” (proleptically, 
historically) towards the first definition, with its connotations of a contaminating 
inward marker of feminine qualities and, specifically, with a feminine “weakness” 
in the face of sexual advances. In Samson’s imagination, this state capaciously 
opens itself to suggestions of anal rape and military dramas of subjection, captivity, 
and male homoeroticism. The self-accusation of “effeminacy” recurs in Samson’s 
thoughts on the uselessness of a merely occasional temperance in a manner which 
telegraphs his terror at occupying a permissive, receptive, passive position: “What 
boots it at one gate to make defense, / And at another to let in the foe / 
Effeminately vanquished?” (560-562). The “other gate” in this image is an 
unexpected entryway into one’s self. In this military scenario (the image is one of 
attackers penetrating a town’s line of defense) “to be conquered” and “to be 
effeminate” somehow lead to and verify each other. Effeminacy makes one a ripe 
and justified target for conquest, and having been conquered confirms and ratifies 
that effeminacy, securing a lasting shame for the vanquished by retroactively 
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projecting a prior condition felt to somehow merit domination as its confirming 
response.  
What relationships might there be between this foundational terror about 
the masculine self’s inbuilt feminine possibility and other forms of terror, in 
particular terror at – not to mention acts of terror against – the unseen multitude 
of racial, religious, and sexual others which crowd in at an uncertain distance 
around the blind Samson? What are the links between the public display of 
Samson as the shaved and humiliated prisoner of war and his own anxiety about 
the loss of manhood? To what extent does Dagon’s formal hybridity incite or call 
forth an act of terror from Samson, and in what way might this response index a 
certain constitutive linkage or provoking resemblance between effeminate 
manhood and pagan assemblage?  
In pursuit of some provisional answers to these questions, I intend to 
borrow some critical tools from recent queer studies, not without some anxiety of 
my own. I adapt the phrase “queer assemblage” and its partners “terrorist 
assemblage” and “terrorist look-alike” from Jasbir Puar’s work on the mutually 
reinforcing homophobic and xenophobic logics (or, if you prefer, anxieties) in play 
within certain persistent acts of violence taking place under the shadow of the 
overarching and, yes, ongoing “war on Terror.”9 In the related figures of the 
terrorist look-alike and the suicide bomber Puar identifies two manifestations of a 
politically and racially volatile form of queerness, one that alternately embodies 
violence and triggers pre-emptive or compensatory acts of violence in response to 
the ambient anxieties of the new security state. The exploding bodies of a suicide 
bomber-and-their-bystanders constitute a “terrorist assemblage” that violently re-
organizes human and machine, flesh and explosive, criminal agent and victim, 
body and urban space, leveling and mixing and reforming both individual bodies 
and social bodies through radical acts of transformation. In Puar’s analysis, 
“Terrorist look-alikes” and “queer assemblages” denote less an identifiable sexual 
/ racial / religious / cultural category than a vertiginous failure of social location 
and the opening up of a threateningly non-specific possibility that constitutes what 
is “queer” now about those bodies that do not allow an implied patriotic “us” to 
feel safe.  
In the first case, the figure of the “terrorist look alike” (say, a turbaned 
man in an airport) induces a panicked proceduralism about the universality of 
security screening in response to a de facto profiling which anxiously overlays 
virtual terrorism onto racialized bodies and faces. By contrast, “queer assemblage” 
is broader in scope and application, but in a particularly forceful reading Puar’s 
text considers the joining of bodies and turbans in Sikh masculinity as a 
combinatorial assemblage in a Deleuzian sense: the interface fashioned between 
fabric and flesh constitutes an essenceless concatenation of materials with 
expressive consistency across a range of examples distributed across geographic 
space and political history, making the resulting point of contact into a constant 
site of becoming and intensification.10 This particular assemblage is queer twice 
over, insofar as its presentation troubles gendered norms and in the process snarls 
the matrices of gender identity and citizenship/national identity. As conceptual 
assemblages themselves, Puar’s terms can seem highly unstable: are they 
	Queer	Milton	
	Early	Modern	Culture	10	 67	
descriptions of bodies or descriptions of the ideologically framed ways in which 
bodies show up for (paranoid, hostile) spectators? Do they describe a political 
situation or a prevalent phobic response to a political situation?  
Describing racist attacks on Sikh men in the wake of 9/11, Puar’s analysis 
flags the symbolic importance of forcibly removing hair in a manner that 
inadvertently recalls the symbolic subjection of the captured, shaved and blinded 
Samson:  
It is not for nothing that in one hate crime incident after 
another, turbans are clawed at viciously, and hair is pulled, 
occasionally even cut off. The intimacy of such violence 
cannot be overstated. The attack functions as a double 
emasculation: the disrobing is an insult to the (usually) male 
representative (Sikh or Muslim) of the community, while the 
removal of the hair entails submission by and to normative 
patriotic masculinities.11  
While in this particular context the subject of this violence is the (mis)recognized 
Sikh male wrongly accused and attacked for summoning up the anxiety of a 
nonspecific but endlessly imminent terrorist threat in their onlookers (finally, a 
wished for end to the threat level orange cloud of unknowing implication in which 
we live), in her work as a whole the term “queer assemblages” seems to designate 
a field of affect magnetized by the tension between two related but opposed 
positions and the bodies that occupy them: the “terrorist look-alike” body of the 
turbaned Sikh male, and the “terrorist assemblage” of the suicide bomber, a body 
that is comprised of organic and inorganic materials, a hybrid creation of 
machine/flesh set to violently reconfigure urban space. The difficulty of the term 
is that each body in and of itself constitutes a “queer assemblage,” but each 
functions through the total field of quasi-legibility which their capacity to stand 
for each other generates (the fear generated by the civic circulation of the 
supposed “terrorist look-alike” might be the primary site through which the 
imagined body of the “suicide bomber” operates more effectively to claim 
social/psychic territory than in any particular site of explosion), and so in a sense 
this differential field too constitutes a “queer assemblage.” Each term triggers their own 
queer effects, and each occupies a contested zone of signification within the 
ongoing war on terror – for the queer critic no less than for the subject of 
“normative patriotic masculinity.”  
As Jasbir Puar extends the term, queerness has more to do with a certain 
affective indeterminacy than it does to any available taxonomy of legible sexual 
practices. In resonant sympathy with both the work of Lee Edelman, Jack 
Halberstam, Madhavi Menon and others, for Puar queerness is not an identity one 
comfortably inhabits but a charge set off by what does not scan, what shows up 
as somehow other; her work accordingly seeks out queerness in “the unexpected, 
the unplanned irruptions, the lines of flight, the denaturalizing of expectation.”12 
At this political moment, what could be less reassuring than the “Monster-
Terrorist-Fag,” Puar and Amit Rai’s term of art for the absolutely inassimilable 
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figure of the “terrorist look-alike” caught in the glance of the security guard, the 
potentially queer body of the turbaned Sikh male whose turban (like and unlike a 
headscarf) is said to induce a layered pair of interpretive anxieties (potentially 
female? potentially terrorist?) for its onlookers. The queer assemblage of the 
“monster-terrorist-fag” is felt to anchor by contrast the normative patriotic 
masculinity of both straight society and, in a decisive turn for Puar’s analysis, a 
privileged (white) body of gay and lesbian “proud Americans” who are by contrast 
eager to vouch for their fealty to neoliberal tolerance in opposition to a Muslim 
outside now reified as inherently un-and-anti-queer. This implicitly Islamophobic 
polarity of affiliation conscripts the “properly queer” liberal and racialized subjects 
– piously invoked in every LGBTQ rollcall – into service as supposed victims 
under threat from Arab, Sikh, Muslim and South Asian communities, in the 
process erasing the existence of queers from those groups and tacitly pinkwashing 
Western democracies.13 This framing constitutes a second differential field: the 
“queer assemblage” of anxiety and reaction that separates the “homonationalist” 
community from its rejected “terrorist look-alikes.”  
“Queer assemblages” do not show up in a triumphalist claiming of 
individual voices or communities but in moments of rupture in the socially 
negotiated; the assemblage is not an assembly, the communal or ghetto-ized safe 
space for consumption staked as a freehold within heteronormativity. “Queer 
assemblage” designates a corporeal, sexual, technological, cultural and historical 
manifold and tries to keep in play the queer body’s provisional status as an 
arrangement open to interpretation and subject to change: bodies extended in time 
(think of the passages a transgendered body has undergone as an arc of becoming), 
bodies marked by violence, bodies marked by choice. It refers to, but does not 
capture and contain, an account of the queer body as a hybrid body, a part-object, 
something supplemented, perhaps enhanced, modified, or altered, something un-
natural, a somatic border area with all gates open.  
Accordingly, in invoking “Dagon as queer assemblage,” I am relying upon 
this elasticity in order to bring out more fully the somatic queerness of Dagon as 
a node in the terrified / fascinated imagination of John Milton, and of Samson 
within Milton’s work. That is, Dagon’s mixture into “one” body of elements both 
male and female, human and animal, monstrous sovereign deity and humiliated 
victim of torture, represents the entirely corporeal and somatic quintessence of 
sin-saturated embodiment, but it does so as an assemblage that is “in some sense 
machined-together”: this “sea-idol” is both a poetic construction and yet also the 
flesh-iest form that flesh can take, occupying the farthest and lowest point from, 
say, the angelic trans-sexuality imagined in Paradise Lost.  
In relocating Puar’s terms and impressing them into service in a reading 
of seventeenth century religious drama, I am producing a necessarily wrenching 
and “forced” cutting and re- assemblage of elements from Milton scholarship and 
queer studies into an encounter that will no doubt seem rather suspect from 
certain locations on both sides of this divide. But I hope to justify such hostage-
taking. When read in terms of the overdetermined significations within its 
scriptural origin(s), and in the cluster of anxieties about sexuality which show up 
within Milton’s creative re-use of this pagan god, Dagon’s bodily form shows up 
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as a “queer assemblage” sourced trans-historically from an anachronistic series of 
layered meanings, species and genders. But the same can be said for Dagon’s 
nemesis. A shaved and humiliated political prisoner put on display by a foreign 
power in an attempt to further disenfranchise a subject people, an anxiously hyper-
masculine hero prone to passionate displays of self-hatred for the taint of 
effeminacy, Samson shows up as both a “queer assemblage” to himself and a 
“terrorist look-alike” for contemporary criticism, insinuating himself into public 
space and then destroying it.14 Alternately absolutely powerless and absolutely 
powerful, in its capacious overtaking of boundary conditions Samson’s body 
reduplicates the formal hybridity of Dagon: a blind-yet- illuminated mind buried 
within a body that acquires and loses traits of both genders, a body that partakes 
of creaturely conditions at the border between the animal and the human, a body 
frozen in postures of living death and roused by inward motions of divine fury.  
 
Milton Studies vs. Queer Studies: a “Clash of Civilizations”?  
Faced with the claim that Milton’s literary representations of Dagon and Samson 
“show up as” queer assemblages, one may well be tempted to ask “for whom?” 
Though perhaps this special issue will prove the contrary, at this point Milton 
studies and queer studies appear to have little to say to each other. That this is so 
emerges from a perhaps not accidental historical divide, and is compounded by 
the habits and tendencies peculiar to both camps. To state the obvious: the first 
waves of “queer theory” were consolidated around the reading of British and 
American nineteenth century literature and culture in dialogue with and informed 
by, however much they critiqued or expanded, Foucault’s History of Sexuality, 
Volume I, and were marked by an oft- simplified and widely disseminated assertion 
supposedly found therein concerning the nineteenth century sexological origins of 
homosexual identity qua medically legible category of personhood.15 The ensuing 
early modern critical responses and correctives, from Bruce R. Smith, Jonathan 
Goldberg, Mario DiGangi, Richard Rambuss, Madhavi Menon and others tended 
to concentrate upon the drama of Shakespeare and Marlowe, or the lyric poetry 
of Barnfield and Spenser, usefully bringing the nineteenth century homosexual 
into an uncannily disjunctive historical/critical relationship with the anticipatory 
but distinct figure of the early modern sodomite. Yet in all the fertile and ongoing 
work to read and theorize about same-sex desire in early modern culture, Milton 
seems, all too frequently, conspicuously absent from the discussion. Given the 
otherwise voluminous amount of work on sex and gender in Milton’s writing, such 
a lacuna still needs explaining.16 I would venture to suggest that this scholarly no-
go area has everything to do with the tenor of Milton scholarship, in which a 
constitutive anxiety about “ruining the sacred truths” and a vexed awareness of 
the watchful paternal gaze of an authorial super-ego seems, still, to inhibit the 
scene of critical investigation when the subject is sexuality.  
There are exceptions to this rule, notably Gregory Bredbeck’s Sodomy and 
Interpretation: From Marlowe to Milton (1991) as well as articles by Jonathan Goldberg, 
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Bruce Boehrer, Claude Summers, Ross Leasure and Philip Rollinson (to name only 
a few). But it seems that each attempt to connect Milton’s literary corpus to the 
concerns and methodologies of queer studies ritualistically reasserts its lonely and 
embattled status. While describing the suppression of the accusations of buggery 
of male servants against Mervin Touchet in the Castlehaven scandal (now widely 
regarded as essential to the background of Milton’s “A Masque at Ludlow Castle, 
1934” [Comus]), Ross Leasure notes that “such tactics were especially employed 
when dealing with Touchet’s homosexual activities, and may coincide with the 
general reticence of Miltonists [. . .] to acknowledge anything “queer” in or about 
the Miltonian canon.”17 Leasure is not alone in feeling so alone.  
The constructive scholarly work that has been done has been dominated 
by redemptive patterns of recovery, of the search for encrypted or lost homosexual 
meaning in an alternately despairing and affirmative historiographical mode that 
Heather Love has memorably identified as “emotional rescue.”18 In Sodomy and 
Interpretation Gregory Bredbeck makes the promising claim that Milton’s work 
“suggests a space of meaning outside the heterocentrically prescriptive codes of 
ideal Renaissance genders,”19 The most compelling example of this outer space 
beyond gender normativity occurs in Paradise Lost’s account of angelic sexuality, 
whose ambiguous suggestions of “a life of homosexual promiscuity” prompted 
dismissive foreclosure of these “filthy” and “foolish” notions from C. S. Lewis in 
his Preface to Paradise Lost. Yet, in a chapter forbiddingly titled “The Mistake About 
Milton’s Angels,” Lewis evades the specter of male homosexual angels by recourse 
to an even queerer formulation of a celestial hermaphroditic free- for-all:  
[. . .] there exists among these creatures, according to Milton, 
something that might be called trans-sexuality. The impulse 
of mutual love is expressed by the total interpenetration of 
two aereal bodies; ‘total they mix’ because they are ductile 
and homogenous- they mix like wine and water, or like two 
wines.20  
Bredbeck notes that “while the fallen spirits can range freely throughout the 
system of sex and gender, unfallen spirits can range freely outside of it.”21 Yet, 
frustratingly, having noted this Bredbeck generally sticks to the script of simply 
discovering or uncovering traces of male homosexuality in the Miltonic text. In 
response to the willful resistance to homosexual signification prevalent within 
Milton criticism, Bredbeck seems more interested in the compensatory 
demonstration that homoerotic meaning was available to Milton within the period 
courtesy of classical pastoral, and that, in choosing not to assign sodomitical 
temptation but rather patriarchal temptation to Belial, Milton demonstrated on at 
least one occasion a willingness to refrain from deploying one available 
commonplace of anti-sodomy rhetoric. The affirmative cast of such critical quarry 
is a first step, but one whose lonesome echo calls for a following response which 
reconsiders the volatility of the a-gendered zones that both Milton’s work and 
Lewis’ text potentially make available to the queer critic.  
	Queer	Milton	
	Early	Modern	Culture	10	 71	
Bredbeck’s recovery of the lost non-heteronormative potential of 
Milton’s angels is a tantalizing possibility upstaged by the central importance 
within his chapter that he grants to a momentary holiday from homophobic abuse 
in Paradise Regained; the real stakes of the project hinge upon the attempt to infer 
some kind of provisional glimmer of acceptance, or at least recognition of a 
specifically male homosexual possibility as slightly less than the worst thing that 
could happen, within the Miltonic corpus. This kind of stance towards the lost or 
encrypted homosexuality exemplifies what Foucault termed “the consoling play 
of recognitions” at the core of traditional historical practice in his essay 
“Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.”22 Bredbeck’s introductory scene of the queer 
theorist righting the homophobic wrongs of past scholarship remains mired in a 
self-serving rhetoric about gay male visibility that belies the conformist contours 
of its own structuring imperative as a scene in which the proliferation of “trans-
sexual” meanings is replaced by the interpretive production of legibly homosexual, 
i.e. homo-normative, male subjects.23  
I want to suggest that if queer readers are to engage Milton’s writing 
otherwise, we should not only hunt for buried, encrypted, or subterranean 
representations of homosexuality and homoeroticism that are potentially positive 
or affirmative in character, but also attend more closely to the negative affects of 
anxiety, shame and hostility generated by moments of queer possibility within 
these texts, and try to think about how issues of form, monstrosity, racialization, 
and hybridity inflect the operation of textual “queerness.” Instead of hopefully 
amplifying one solitary instance in which Milton pulls a punch and demurs from 
attacking sodomy with gusto, one might also want to discuss the far more frequent 
occasions on which he happily and enthusiastically does exactly that, and to listen 
more closely to the grain and character of that hostility. These moments of 
antagonism and hatred for sodomy and effeminacy seem intuitively more 
consistent with the overall tenor of Milton’s religious commitments and rhetorical 
postures as I read and understand them, and owning up to them in the context of 
a queer reading might allow us to avoid the “Milton-one-of-us syndrome” that 
Marshall Grossman has identified as one of the stumbling blocks to 
appropriationist encounters with Milton that seek to reform or refashion Milton 
to better resemble contemporary ideals.24 Such a reorientation seems necessary if 
we are to provide a productive account of how and where “queerness” surfaces 
within the Miltonic corpus.  
 
Blind Sodomites and Hybrid Animals  
Comprising curiously macho fifteen-year-old female virgins, curiously weepy 
shaven- headed strongmen, coy trans-sexual angels, thyrsus-wielding Virgilian 
shepherds, and Puritan propagandists prone to curiously theatrical displays of anti-
theatrical ranting, Miltonic queerness is an affective/rhetorical manifold that 
swings both ways between praise and blame. But it tends towards blame. When it 
arises in the prose writing, queer meanings and significations produce a choppy 
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linguistic surface of strongly negative repudiation, virulent disgust and comic 
scorn. Milton’s willingness to rhetorically tar his enemies with a sodomitical brush 
is an old habit born during his first officially sanctioned engagement for the 
Council of State as Secretary for Foreign Tongues of the interregnum government, 
Eikonoklastes (1649). In the preface to that text, those who praise and dote upon 
Charles I’s defects, because they are his, are said to inhabit a state of “strucken 
blindness” which borders upon the comparable spiritual blindness of Sodomites:  
That they who from the first beginning or but now of late, 
by what unhappiness I know not, are so much affatuated 
not with his person only but with his palpable faults, and 
dote upon his deformities, may have none to blame but their 
own folly if they live and die in such a strucken blindness, 
as next to that of Sodom hath not happened to any sort of 
men more gross or more misleading.25  
 
That sodomites are accused of spiritual blindness is a telling accusation coming 
from someone in the midst of a battle with literal, physical blindness, and tempts 
one to hear sadness and fear blending beneath the defensive, hectoring tone. This 
strategic disavowal of blindness (“it is not I who am blind but you”) recurs, of 
course, in the Second Defense in the context of Milton’s assault on the royalist’s 
emotional attachment to the legacy of the martyred Charles, an attachment that he 
repeatedly characterizes as effeminate.26  
Such shaming recurs throughout the Second Defense of the English People, as 
when he cattily refers to his continental opponent as “Salmasius (or Salmasia, for 
which of the two he was, the open domination of his wife, both in public and in 
private, had made it quite difficult to determine).”27 Writing against Alexander 
More and Adriaan Vlacq, respectively the supposed author and the publisher of 
The Cry of the Royal Blood to Heaven, against the English Parricides, whose agitated attacks 
upon both Milton’s person constituted the occasion for the Second Defense, Milton 
transfers the accusation from an ad hominem attack into a corresponding charge 
against their writing: “These peddlers of effeminate little verses – who would not 
despise them?”28 While such rhetorical assaults are neither surprising given the 
pamphlet-war context nor particularly unique to Milton, I wish to argue that they 
are, for all this, more than a passing reflex of vituperation. If, in cocking one’s ear 
to the tone with which the linked accusations of sodomy and effeminacy are 
thrown at Milton’s enemies in the tracts and pamphlets, one hears curiously 
persistent notes of strangled, encrypted, and disavowed identification, some might 
object that this only indexes the perverse interpretive reflex engendered by a rote 
queer studies praxis all too eager to immediately flip expressions of disgust into 
expressions of covert desire. Such moves can of course seem awfully glib, a kind 
of queer-positive theoretical variant of the everyday acts of “wild psychoanalysis” 
committed beneath the shade of a popular psychology giggling to itself about 
omnipresent “latent homosexuality.” Sometimes disgust is just disgust. And yet, 
Milton’s willingness to publicly connect blindness with sodomy in the context of 
his pamphlet-war combat with his Royalist enemies is simply too fraught with 
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overdetermined layers of identification and disavowal to ignore, precisely because 
the trope of sodomitical blindness was invoked in the period as a figure for both 
physically reproductive “errant” desires and for textually (over)productive critical 
activity.  
Admittedly, the counterintuitive assertion that “blind” acts of sodomy 
must be understood as reproductive in a manner that models certain kinds of textual 
productivity will require some historical explanation and fleshing out. The 
accusation in Eikonoklastes that the men of Sodom suffered from some kind of 
spiritual “blindness” was indeed a commonplace; what is compelling for my 
argument is that this specific connection between blindness and sodomy was 
figured in the prose of the period not (only) in conjunction with homosexuality 
but with the production of monstrous and chimerical hybrids that were said to be 
the result of acts of sodomy committed upon animals. Consider the following 
extended discussion of “a cow that gave birth to a half- man” in Ambroise Paré’s 
teratological tract On Monsters and Marvels:  
Now I shall refrain from writing here about several other 
monsters engendered from such grist, together with their 
portraits, which are so hideous and abominable, not only to 
see but also to hear tell of, that, due to their great 
loathsomeness I have neither wanted to relate them nor 
have them portrayed. For (as Boistau says, after having 
related several sacred and profane stories, which are all filled 
with grievious punishment for lechers) what can atheists 
and sodomists expect, who (as I said above) couple against 
God and Nature with brute animals? On this subject, Saint 
Augustine says the punishment of lechers is to fall into blindness and 
to become insane, after they have forsaken God, and not to see their 
blindness, being unable to follow good counsel.29  
Far from being condemned to an unproductive and anality-inflected sterility, the 
spiritually “blind” sodomite is instead figured as all-too-fertile, creating a hybrid 
offspring whose unspeakable / unrepresentable loathsomeness in fact energizes 
and makes possible the very text that struggles to reject it. Unfazed by Paré’s 
strong expressions of personal disgust and stated unwillingness to have such 
monsters portrayed, the editors of the text accompanied his description of such 
monstrous births with a suitably bizarre sequence of woodcuts depicting the 
products of such unions: “Figure of a child, part dog,” “Figure of a monster with 
the face of a man and the body of a goat,” “A monster, half-man, half-swine,” 
“Figure of a monster like a dog with the head like a bird,” etc.30 It is here that the 
queerness of early modern sodomy – rather than and indeed, instead of, the 
homosexuality of early modern sodomy – emerges most forcefully: sodomitical 
sexuality was imagined in the period as a potentially reproductive sexuality, and its 
hybrid generativity cannot be thought outside of a subtending racial imaginary 
which regarded the possibility of such mixtures with fear and fascination.  
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Similarly, while descanting upon the specific quality of his opponent’s 
sodomitical and effeminate deformity, Milton decries their literary production as a 
monstrous hybrid in a manner that reminds one of Paré’s medical catalogues of 
hybrid monsters. Consider this mockery of More and Vlaacq in the Second Defense 
in terms of Paré’s beast-fable of sodomitical creation:  
But listen! Another Cry, something strange and hissing. I 
take it that geese are flying in from somewhere or other. 
Now I realize what it is. I remember that this is the Tragedy 
of a Cry. The Chorus appears. Behold two poetasters – 
either two or a single one, twofold in appearance and of two 
colors. Should I call it a sphinx, or that monster which 
Horace described in the Ars Poetica, with the head of a 
woman, the neck of an ass, clad in varied plumage, with 
limbs assembled from every source? Yes, this is that very 
monster.31  
 
Far from a stereotypical overspill of a liquid femininity into the solid terrain of 
masculine psychic life, the monstrous sodomitical construction of royalist writing 
requires a new morphological imaginary that solders together component parts 
sourced across gender and species barriers and stapled together seemingly by 
chance.32 The mongrel nature of these creations mirrors the mongrel nature of 
their creators, and the royalist authors are themselves understood as aggregates of 
components: in a paratactic and inclusive jumbling of linked but separate 
pejorative senses that calls to mind Polonius’ “tragical-comical-historical-
pastoral,” Milton’s opponents are censured for presenting the public with the 
blind-sodomitical-hybrid- effeminate-theatrical.  
In evoking the monstrosity of a creature “with limbs assembled from 
every source” taken out of Horace, Milton here refers to the lines which begin the 
famous “Letter to Piso,” which I provide here in Ben Jonson’s translation as 
“Horace, of the Art of Poetry”:  
If to a woman’s head a painter would 
Set a horse-neck, and diverse feathers fold  
On every limb, ta’en from a severall creature,  
Presenting upwards a fair female feature.  
Which in some swarthy fish uncomely ends:  
Admitted to the sight, although his friends,  
Could you contain your laughter?33  
 
In contrast with this painted image, great poetry ought to “Be simple, quite 
throughout, and wholly one.” By yoking together human and animal elements and 
miscegenating the “fair” and the “swarthy” into an uncomely new (anti)form, the 
painter’s work fails to achieve synthesis and verisimilitude, stalling instead at the 
level of collage with a one-man cadavre exquis. Yet the very priority of this 
assemblage, coming as it does at the head of an extended discussion of 
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compositional strategy, lends a curious kind of exemplarity and mystique to this 
icon of the ridiculous; indeed the incident itself feels appended like an extraneous 
head onto the rambling text that follows it, tainting the compositional lecture itself 
with an associative formal resemblance to the chimerical anecdote that begins it. 
Furthermore, one might want to attend to the private unveiling of this image as a 
gendered scene, in which the homosocial sodality of male artist and his friends 
gather together to regard a painted image of a female body gone awry. The inability 
to correctly fashion an imaginary woman marks the painter with a double lack: a 
lapse in artistic skill that may also signal a failure of sexual maturity and savoir-
faire. One has failed as a man and as a painter if one does not know how to “make” 
a woman. Further complicating this humorous scene, racial anxiety compounds 
and reinforces gender monstrosity. The mixture of the human and the inhuman 
and the mixture of the “fair” and the “swarthy” presents human- animal hybrids 
and racially mixed hybrids as if it were already intuitively obvious that they figure 
each other, thus reifying the subordinate inhumanity of “swarthy” races as a 
naturalized reflection of the species barrier among animals while replacing the 
frightening possibility of the biological viability of interracial mixtures with a 
comically “impossible” gallimaufry of scraps.  
One way to measure the distance between Horatian poetics and their early 
modern recurrence is precisely in the shifting position of such assemblages along 
the spectrum between praise and blame. Far from functioning transparently as a 
self-evident example of the failure of the poet to observe the laws of 
representational decorum, by the sixteenth century the construction of such 
chimerical assemblages came to be daringly identified with the very essence of the 
poetic act, now redefined as a prosthetic extension of the natural into “a new 
nature.” The phrase comes from Sir Philip Sidney’s Defence of Poetry (1595), in which 
the quasi-magical capacity of the poet to re-form nature is invoked in reference to 
the deliberate construction of the unnatural: “Only the poet, disdaining to be tied 
to any such subjection, lifted up with the vigor of his own invention, doth grow 
in effect another nature, in making things either better than nature bringeth forth, 
or, quite anew, forms such as never were in nature, as the Heroes, Demigods, 
Cyclops, Chimeras, Furies, and such like.”34 If this repertoire of new creations is 
resolutely classical, the assertion of the dignity of artificiality sounds a distinctly 
un-Horatian note, but also admits directly the possibility of the chimerical 
assemblage as a desired object, as something not only monstrous but also 
intoxicating, fascinating.  
Such a possibility is consciously kept under wraps in Milton’s prose. For 
Milton, at least in the heated moment of rhetorical battle, the compositional failure 
involved in fashioning such a “very monster” reflects back upon the failed genders 
of their creators in a manner calculated to revive the censorious critical laughter 
that Horace also sought to inspire. The effeminacy of More and Vlaacq, their 
status as men somehow mixed with and compromised by a contemptible surplus 
of femininity, is mirrored in the formal admixtures of their literary creations: they, 
like their writing, are hybrids, chimerical assemblages, equally comical and 
repellent. But the Horatian background to Milton’s passing swipe also signals a 
more important connection between the gendered rhetoric of his prose and the 
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imaginative substratum of his poetry. The Horatian monstrosity is not only part 
female, but part fish, and this specific woman/fish assemblage recurs in a telling 
(and also partially submerged) manner in Milton’s representation of Dagon, the 
Philistine deity whose festival triggers Samson’s cataclysmic outburst of divine 
violence in Samson Agonistes.  
 
Dagon as Queer Assemblage  
Reappearing at every stage of his poetic development, the image of Dagon’s 
violated, inhuman form seems to enjoy the status of an idée fixe in Milton’s literary 
imagination. Dagon initially appears in “On the Morning of Christ’s Nativity,” in 
Milton’s first catalog of pagan divinities bewailing the birth of the Savior, as an 
epithet of abuse rather than a proper name: “Peor and Baalim, / Forsake their 
temples dim, / With that twice-battered god of Palestine.” (lines 197-199) When 
Dagon returns in the catalog of pagan gods and “gay religions of pomp and gold” 
in Book I of Paradise Lost, Milton’s describes in detail this “twice battered” 
Palestinian body’s progress from hybrid formation to humbling mutilation:  
Next came one 
Who mourned in earnest, when the captive ark  
Maimed his brute image, head and hands lopped off  
In his own temple, on the grunsel edge, 
Where he fell flat, and shamed his worshippers:  
Dagon his name, sea monster, upward man  
And downward fish: yet had his temple high 
Reared in Azotus, dreaded through the coast 
Of Palestine, in Gath and Ascalon 
And Accaron and Gaza’s frontier bounds. (457-466)  
 
The recent Kerrigan, Rumrich and Fallon edition points out that “‘Dag’ is Hebrew 
for fish” but does not further clarify that Dagon’s fishy provenance is the result 
of a false etymological slippage between the original Ugaritic root word for grain 
(“dgn”) and its Hebrew near- homonym.35 For our purposes this misprision need 
not detain us, as Milton’s understanding of Dagon is derived entirely from the 
Hebrew text of 1. Samuel 5.1-7, which describes the Philistine captivity of the ark 
and the humiliating outcome of a combat between the Ark of the Covenant and 
the idol of Dagon. In the Geneva Bible (1560) the passage reads as follows:  
Then the Philistims toke the Arke of God and caryed it from 
Eben-ezer unto Ashdod, Evn the Philistims toke the Arke 
of God, and broght it into the house of Dagon, and set it by 
Dagon. And they of Ashdod rose the next day in the 
morning, beholde, Dagon was fallen upon his face on the 
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ground before the Arke of the Lord, and they toke up 
Dagon, and set him in his place againe. Also they rose up 
early in the morning the next day, & beholde, Dagon was 
falle upon his face on the grounde before the Arke of the 
Lord, and the head of Dagon and the two palmes of his 
hands were cut off upon the thresholde: onely the stumpe 
of Dagon was left to him. (I. Samuel 5.1-4)  
Period Biblical scholarship rendered the latent “meaning” in Dagon’s name 
explicit in marginal commentary on this passage; the Geneva Bible glosses this tale 
with a note that Dagon “was their chiefe idole, & as some write, from ye [. . .] 
downward like a fishe, and upwarde like a man.” (I. Samuel.5.2), a description 
directly echoed, but poetically corrected, in Milton’s epic, which tumbles across 
the linebreak to formally enact the split in his morphology: “Dagon his name, sea 
monster, upward man / And downward fish.” (462-463)36 But Milton’s sequential 
descent from higher humanity to lower animality also, of course, summons in the 
mind of the reader the half- conscious internal expectation of a term more 
frequently held in opposition to the dominant term of “man,” namely, woman. 
From the waist up Dagon may be all man, but the fishy nether regions swim with 
alternate morphological possibilities.  
I do not mean to suggest that Dagon is “really” female in any clear sense; 
indeed, to do so would be to shut down the liquidity of Dagon’s oceanic 
associations and to misrepresent the manifold nature of how Milton understands 
divine form. In its capacity to slip free of the intransigent weight of the merely 
sexed human, Dagon’s underlayer of hermaphroditic meanings partakes of the 
material ambiguity attendant upon not only embryonic potential humans but all 
spirits, both angelic and demonic:  
For spirits when they please 
Can either sex assume, or both; so soft 
And uncompounded is their essence pure, 
Nor tied or manacled with joint or limb, 
Nor founded on the brittle strength of bones, 
Like cumbrous flesh; but in what shape they choose  
Dilated or condensed, bright or obscure, 
Can execute their airy purposes 
And works of love or enmity fulfill. (423-431)  
 
Noting such choice and flexibility only takes us so far, however, and in the case of 
Dagon it ignores the brute fact of idolatry’s fixation not on an airy spirit but on an 
object that can be mutilated or knocked down. The tale in Samuel of the 
prostration of Dagon’s idol before the Ark, and of the subsequent decapitation of 
the idol resolutely materializes Dagon into a massive, thingly affront to the 
primacy of the god of Israel.  
Dagon’s abased and mutilated status in the text of Samuel (first forced to 
bow down to the Ark, then decapitated and symbolically “circumcised” by the 
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skinning of the palms of both hands) irrevocably marks this divine body as a key 
site through which to think about the anxiety generated by difference: the tribal 
conflict between the Philistines and the Israelites plays itself out in a violent script 
about the failure of idolatry that nonetheless resorts to its figurative logic. Dagon’s 
subordination to the Ark is a battle between two idols, and the text’s sadistic 
imperative to wound or insult the idol of Dagon at some level perpetuates the very 
thing the story is meant to disprove (idols are powerful, and the need to physically 
chasten Dagon’s idol pays perverse complement to its totemic authority and 
representational fitness as a tribal protector). Marking and maiming the idol of the 
enemy expresses a rage to differentiate that encrypts an anxious sense of 
proximity; it is not safe to set Dagon and the Ark beside each other. If Dagon’s 
body is marked in its appearance in Paradise Lost as irrevocably wounded by its 
encounter with the absolute sovereignty of the Ark, Dagon in Samson Agonistes 
telescopes backwards before this event from Samuel to Judges, and represents 
idolatry ascendant, a chiasmic popular embodiment of both the error of 
monstrosity and the monstrosity of error.  
Forecasting and inverting this conflict, Manoa’s shaming speech to his 
son constitutes a kind of traumatic alternative to the text of Samuel, a fearful 
scenario in which the God of Israel is brought low by Dagon ascendant:  
This day the Philistines a popular feast 
Here celebrate in Gaza, and proclaim 
Great pomp, and sacrifice, and praises loud 
To Dagon, as their god who hath delivered 
Thee Samson bound and blind into their hands,  
Them out of thine, who slew’st them many a slain.  
So Dagon shall be magnified, and God,  
Besides whom is no God, compared with idols,  
Disglorified, blasphemed, and had in scorn 
By th’idolatrous rout amidst their wine. (434-443)  
 
We can now see why Samson’s self-hatred and Samson’s hatred of Dagon are 
mutually supportive: his effeminate subjection to Dalila has produced the God of 
Israel’s idolatrous subjection to Dagon. The idol’s hybridity as a man/fish 
(woman) assemblage shamefully signifies Samson’s exogamous desires, 
embodying in a grotesquely literal manner the “mixture with the other” that has 
effeminately subjected the Nazarite hero to a foreign woman. Neither fish nor 
flesh, Dagon’s mixed status recalls the shame brought down upon his head by 
Samson’s own exogamous wanderings from his people in favor of sexual alliances 
with ethnically (racially?) distinct women, first with the nameless “woman of 
Timna” and then with Dalila. To put it baldly, so to speak, Samson’s shame arises 
as a result of his sexual preference. His status as the deliverer and judge of his 
people has been compromised by his desire to stray from them into bed with 
Canaanites and Philistines.  
Seen from different angles, Dagon represents both Samson and Dalila, 
and this mutual figuration furthers the play of resemblance within the text as 
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“manliness” encounters itself in its others. As a strange woman and her strange 
god, Dalila and Dagon are made to subtly stand in for each other in a revealing, if 
comic, moment in Samson Agonistes when the chorus describes the approach of an 
ambiguous figure to the blind hero: “But who is this, what thing of sea or land? / 
Female of sex it seems” (710-711) The chorus’ confusion about this mysterious 
entity from either sea or land has been taken to be a mockery of Aristotelian 
disquisition and progressively finer distinctions, but it also seems richly resonant 
with Dagon’s chimerical status as an idolatrous “thing” composed of elements 
from both “sea” and “land.” Dalila’s mysterious apparition to the chorus hovers 
between the borders policed by the anti-idolatrous injunction of Exodus 20.4. 
(“You shall not make for yourself an idol, whether in the form of anything that is 
in heaven above, or that is on the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the 
earth.”) In elevating his romantic allegiance to Dalila above his duties as a Nazarite 
to Israel, Samson in effect has committed a kind of romantic/sexual idolatry in 
choosing her that the poetic drama works to repudiate and correct. If Dalila only 
“seems” to be of female sex, this certainly calls the chorus’ own visual acuity into 
question, fingering them as “blind guides” to Samson who only just see better than 
the blind slave they counsel, but it also further amplifies the queerness of the 
Dalila/Dagon pair, suggesting that there is something misleading or astray about 
their very gender, something either in disguise or permanently in the process of 
becoming. In the wake of her final salvo to Samson, Dalila becomes an animal: 
“She’s gone, a manifest serpent by her sting / Discovered in the end, till now 
concealed.” (997-998) In this final act of “becoming animal” she shares a fate with 
Samson’s posthumous choral description, which is, is Julia Lupton’s fine phrase, 
“a veritable eruption of animalia.”37 Figuring him first as a Dragon, and then as an 
Eagle, Samson’s aura of monstrous power and brute inhumanity are subjected to 
a final torque of gender and species re-assignment when the chorus compares his 
final resurgence of divine strength with the resurrection of the female Phoenix 
from her own “ashy womb” (1697-1705).  
 
Samson as “Terrorist Look-Alike” and Dagon Look-Alike  
Less than kin and more than kind, “anxiety” and “terror” occupy a usefully 
disjunctive proximity to each other in critical work on affect, and since I have slid 
between these two terms in order to think about Samson’s anxiety and his acts of 
terror as a linked pair, I had better explain why. As Sianne Ngai has usefully 
sketched in the introduction to her chapter on anxiety in Ugly Feelings, anxiety is 
both omnipresent and under-theorized, particularly in psychoanalysis, where, in 
an account less than fully cashed out by Freud, it is suggestively if fleetingly 
described as the projected displacement onto others of a trait disavowed yet 
discovered in the self.38 Described by Ernst Bloch as an “expectant emotion” that 
“opens out entirely [into the] horizon of time,” anxiety manifests its distorting 
effects in the present on behalf of a dreadful, imminent futurity, a potentiality held 
always in reserve.39 By contrast, to rise from “mere” anxiety to the exalted and 
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heightened affective state of genuine “terror” would seem to require some kind of 
direct encounter with the threatening presence/existence of the object-cause of 
fear; terror, to be legitimate, needs some kind of proof or objective ratification, 
and here Ngai’s attention to the “ignoble” strains of affect usefully flags the 
problematic comparative “weakness” of anxiety in comparison with its grandiose 
neighbor, terror.40 Insofar as terror is terror “at” something and anxiety is a 
projection “from” the self, the two would seem to just miss each other, falling on 
either side of some hoary boundaries that we theorists are said to do without: 
public/private, self/other.  
But the overlapping yet distinct states of terror and anxiety can feed and 
sustain each other: Within the rhetorical self-understanding of the ongoing “war 
on terror” that characterizes both government policy and public discourse in the 
United States, the wrenching, confirming experience of terrorist violence “proves” 
that our sources of terror have an external cause in this world whose potential 
future resurgence verifies and legitimates an ongoing, endless vigilance whose 
signature affect is a slow burn of omnipresent anxiety. Anxiety stands in for but 
also draws its support from the enabling fact of “terror,” closing a feedback loop 
anchored at both ends of a temporal horizon: the terror of “then” sanctions the 
anxiety of “now” on behalf of an endlessly expected return of a terror “to come.”  
Working through the intersection of these terms, I think we can overlay 
the temporal/social structure of displacement at the core of theories of anxiety 
onto the dramatic structure of Samson Agonistes, allowing us to think about 
Samson’s final act of destructive religious violence (an act of “terror”) as a violent 
ratification and expulsive expression of an ongoing emotional state (his nonstop 
“act” – in the sense of public affective display – of anxiety). Releasing anxiety into 
terror, the destruction of the feast of Dagon is the triumphant terrorist catastrophe 
that retroactively justifies and releases the affect stored/savored/suffered as 
anxiety across Milton’s notoriously static, staunchly talky exercise in Senecan 
closet-drama. Framed thusly, that very dramatic structure’s problematic 
resemblance to narrative arcs at work in the ongoing “war on Terror,” a context 
through which Milton’s text is increasingly read, redoubles this problem of anxiety 
as the refusal of a resemblance (or, really, the terrifying grip of the fearful 
recognition of a resemblance). In particular, I think we can read recent 
expenditures of critical energy dedicating to preventing terrorist meaning from 
attaching to Milton as themselves an ongoing work of anxious displacement.  
This is particularly the case with the pressure that the Carey/Fish debate 
continues to exert upon the scene of Milton interpretation. Acknowledgement of 
the “debate” is mandatory, if the introductory comments included in recent critical 
editions of Milton are taken as evidence. Stoking the flames in a contest of ever 
more indignant and anxious defenses of Milton/Fish (it is occasionally hard to tell 
the difference in the more partisan accounts) from these charges, the recent 
anthology Milton in the Age of Fish: Essays on Authorship, Text, and Terrorism collects 
together a range of responses to the controversy, including, naturally, a 
quintessentially barbed and bemused contribution from Fish himself.  
To reduce things down to proper size, the dispute hinges upon debates 
about the fitness of Carey’s account of Fish’s account of Milton’s account of 
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Samson’s understanding of a divine message from God that sanctions the violent 
destruction of the feast of Dagon. In a usefully skeptical assessment of the entire 
exchange, Feisal G. Mohammed notes the subterranean consensus that organizes 
this mutually convenient display of polemical pyrotechnics on both the (lonely) 
Carey side and in the (overpopulated) Fish camp. Each side works to protect 
Milton from openly advocating a “terrorist” meaning. Having parsed Fish’s 
reading as one which leads us to the uncomfortable conclusion that Milton gives 
us no way to discredit the “great act” that Samson commits, Carey’s most 
inflammatory statements are interrogatives: if this is what Samson Agonistes itself 
advocates, “should [the work] not be withdrawn from schools and colleges and, 
indeed, banned more generally as an incitement to terrorism?”41 These calls are 
designed to prompt a solidly humanist “surely not” from the TLS congregation, 
and manifest Carey’s faith that Milton must be critiquing religious violence and 
urging us to read Samson’s “rousing inward motions” that prompt his destruction 
of the temple of Dagon critically and ironically.42  
Demurring from common ground, the Fish contingent respond that the 
problem of how to evaluate Samson’s violence is the point of the poem, alleging 
that we cannot know whether or not Milton condemns Samson because we cannot 
know whether the “rousing inward motions” that Samson feels do indeed come 
from God or not.43 The dispute stalls at the limits of what we can know about 
“the interior recesses of the willing and intending heart.”44 There is, I think, a 
curious queer echo here. Try reading the following account of Samson’s 
motivations with a queer inflection: “Only the intention, the unbidden and 
constitutive inward orientation, makes the difference, and the difference can only 
be recognized by one who is its (internal) bearer. It takes one to know one.”45 Fish is 
talking about how to tell a terrorist from a religiously inspired hero, but his 
language of “willing hearts” and “unbidden orientations” suggests an altogether 
queerer register of intersubjective speculation. Reading the anxiety generated by 
the threat of effeminacy “within” (in every sense) Samson alongside the critical 
anxiety generated by the threat of terrorist meaning within Milton’s text, a shared 
logic of displacement produces a formal structure in which an inaccessible abyss 
of interiority is posited as a bar to knowing/seeing. Effeminacy on the plane of 
gender and terrorism on the plane of religious politics occupy a shared structural 
position as the excluded-yet-ineradicable perverse possibility that mobilizes and 
justifies a violent and repressive response within the text and in the persistent 
patterns of critical denial outside and about it.46  
I hope I have not been struggling by oblique or critically paranoid means 
to say that there is some proto-, crypto-, demi-, quasi-, or pseudo-homosexual 
subject buried “within” the encrypted inwardness of Samson’s “rousing inward 
motions,” nor am I suggesting that his repeated bewailing of his effeminacy 
constitutes some repudiation of an “inner” homosexual subjectivity.47 Patently, 
Samson’s anxiety about his effeminacy is not hidden, repressed or concealed; it’s 
there on the page before us, and present in his mouth as he bewails its “foul 
embrace” to anyone who will listen. What is displaced, disavowed, or refused by 
Samson is a feeling of proximity or resemblance between himself and the 
creaturely hybridity of Dagon, a feeling that collects as anxiety and explodes into 
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terror. With this dynamic in mind, let us now return to Lupton’s formulation with 
which I began: “Milton’s Samson is finally not typological (a figure of Christ), or 
even typological in a terminally suspended way (“exil’d from light”), but anti-
typological, arresting the recuperative moment of typology in the sheer violence of 
his act.”48 The title of Lupton’s essay, “Samson Dagonistes,” elegantly weds two 
elements that I have joined together, with far less elegance, as a “queer 
assemblage,” and I owe much of my own understanding of how to think about 
the politics and poetics of Milton’s writing to her example. But here I want to 
suggest that the violent resistance to the hold or claim of typology within Samson 
that Lupton detects might be directed not forward to Christian appropriations and 
equivalences but “backwards,” to the forces of chthonic and pagan idolatry that 
press up against his blind, subjected, “effeminated” Nazarite body. The 
resemblance being violently rejected is not a resemblance between Samson and 
Christ but rather the resemblance between Samson and Dagon, the typological 
equivalence that Lupton’s very title proposes, in which the sidelong axis of 
comparison and competition (which will later produce the decisive conflict 
between God and Dagon in 1 Samuel) screens out the backwards/inwards 
pressure of effeminacy within and the terrifying, terror-producing pressures of 
racial/sexual/ethnic/species-based otherness without.  
 
Chimerical Conclusion  
The notion of an “assemblage” need not, in and of itself, arrive fraught with 
terrifying implications: if Dagon is an inter-species assemblage, so is a chicken and 
bacon sandwich. Yet the chimerical hybrid body remains threatening, and 
threateningly present all the same, and not only in the terrorist register that Jasbir 
Puar has theorized; as hasty legislation and corporate bioethical policy boards 
struggle to catch up with the accelerating pace of genetic engineering, our own 
historical moment is one of the nonstop proliferation of biological chimeras, 
hybrids, mashups, “queer assemblages” across national borders and species 
barriers.49 In a passage from “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” that has become 
something of a touchstone for queer theory, Michel Foucault wrote that: “History 
becomes ‘effective’ to the degree that it introduces discontinuity into our very 
being–as it divides our emotions, dramatizes our instincts, multiplies our body and 
sets it against itself.”50 Surveying the ruined panorama of the present, it is not hard 
to find discontinuities in our being, divided emotions, instinctual dramas, 
multiplied bodies, and states divided against themselves. Indeed, it’s hard not to 
find them. One might point to the way that Craigslist murders compete with 
transatlantic bombers, embryonic rabbit-human fusions, pigs whose hearts beat 
with human blood, and instantly uplinked cell phone footage of bombed funerals, 
bombed weddings, executed tyrants and decapitated journalists for the 
morcellated remains of our attention – were it not for the sad certainty that 
nothing dates faster than the contemporary indexes of our own supposedly 
irreversible freefall into fragmentation. If (and this is a genuine if) the trans-
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historical acts of recognition that queer studies have up to now provided have 
helped us to understand the desires, pleasures, and terrors of bodies past, there is 
no standing guarantee that these logics – of assemblage, of anxiety – will continue 
to address the divided and discontinuous bodies of today. Foucault told us that 
“the genealogist needs history to dispel the chimeras of the origin.”51 What 
resources do we need in order to converse with the chimeras of the present?  
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